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ABSTRACT
We examine the competition between a group of Internet retailers that operate in an environment
where a price search engine plays a dominant role. We show that for some products in this
environment, the easy price search makes demand tremendously price-sensitive. Retailers, though,
engage in obfuscation---practices that frustrate consumer search or make it less damaging to firms---
resulting in much less price sensitivity on other products. We discuss several models of obfuscation
and examine its effects on demand and markups empirically. Observed markups are adequate to
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When Internet commerce ﬁrst emerged one heard a lot about the promise of “frictionless
commerce.” Internet technologies would make it easy for consumers to ﬁnd the exact
product they wanted and to compare prices from competing retailers.1 The most intriguing
demonstration of this potential so far is price search engines. A consumer who knows the
exact product he or she wants need only type the name into Dealtime, mySimon, Shopper,
Pricewatch, Pricescan or Kelkoo to receive instantaneously and without charge a nicely
sorted list of the prices charged by dozens of e-retailers. Once a curiosity, these sites now
have tens of millions of users.2 Internet search is also aﬀecting many “brick and mortar”
industries. For example, a recent J.D. Power survey indicated that about one quarter of all
new car buyers reported that Internet research had a “big impact” on their make/model
choice.3 The diﬀusion of Internet search technologies has been suﬃciently slow, however,
so that their potential impact is much greater than the impact we have seen so far.
The goal of this paper is to provide some insights into how online and traditonal retail
may be aﬀected as price search technologies improve and become more popular. Our most
basic messages is that economists should think about “obfuscation” as well as search: as
search technologies improve ﬁrms will have an incentive to put some “friction” back in the
market by creating an environment in which price search is more diﬃcult or at least less
of a threat to proﬁtability. We explore the interaction of search, price search engines, and
obfuscation with a variety of methodologies: we present some informal descriptive evidence;
we develop some formal models; and we carry out several econometric analyses of an online
retail environment in which a search engine plays a central role.
1For example, in 1999, The Wall Street Journal quoted an economist with Lehman Brothers who es-
timated that e-commerce would cut inﬂation by half a percentage point by 2002 because “the Internet
eliminates local monopoly power.” See “New E-conomy: If E-commerce Helps Kill Inﬂation, Why Did
Prices Just Spike?” The Wall Street Journal, October 18, 1999, A1.
2ComScore Media Metrix reported that Dealtime was visited by 13.8 million distinct U.S. users in August
of 2003, which is about 9% of all U.S. Internet users. CNET’s 2002 annual report indicates that its shopping
sites, which include mySimon and Shopper as well as sites oﬀering product reviews, received referral fees
from more than 100 million clickthroughs. Dealtime’s visitor total is up about 300% from 2000. See White
(2000) for more on the impact of price search engines circa 2000.
3The J.D. Power survey result was announced in an October 1, 2003 press release. Another example
is airline demand, which is surely aﬀected by the popularity of sites like Expedia, Travelocity, and Orbitz.
ComScore Media Metrix reports that each had over 10 million unique visitors per month as of October 2003.
1We begin with a brief theoretical discussion of price search engines. We mention some
potential paradoxes that any model of price search must resolve. For example, a price
search engine could not make any money if it induced retailers to compete prices down to
marginal cost. We argue that is is not hard to get around these problems and develop a
theory of price search engines as long as one allows the search engines to have suﬃcient
pricing instruments.
We use a simple reduced-form model to illustrate why search engines will often want
to create a perfectly frictionless environment. This conﬂicts with the wishes of retailers,
who earn zero proﬁts in frictionless environments. We argue that it is therefore useful to
think of search frictions as being determined in a a balance-of-power game in which search
engines’ eﬀorts to reduce frictions are counteracted by retailers’ eﬀorts to obfuscate. How
technological improvements aﬀect the equilibrium level of search frictions in such a model
is clearly ambiguous.
The theory section concludes with a sketch of two speciﬁc models illustrating ways in
which one can formalize the idea of obfuscating actions raising equilibrium proﬁts. One
of these uses standard search theory ideas. It is a theory in which obfuscation makes
search more diﬃcult and thereby reduces consumer learning. The other, detailed in Ellison
(2003), is a competitive price discrimination model. It is a theory in which obfuscation
doesn’t actually reduce consumer learning in equilibrium, but instead reduces the degree
to which consumer learning hurts ﬁrm proﬁtability.
Firms have, of course, always tried to thwart price search. We feel that the Internet
may, however, make obfuscation more important for two reasons. First, improved search
tools make ﬁrms worse oﬀ it they do not engage in obfuscation. Second, the Internet may
make obfuscation cheaper and easier in a number of ways. One is traditional retailers must
hire a substantial number of articulate salespeople if they want to oﬀer nonstandard sales
contracts, to use legal “bait-and-switch” techniques, or to oﬀer personalized prices, whereas
Internet retailers can easily create automated sales pitches which cheaply implement all of
these strategies.4 Another is that e-retail purchases are naturally bundled with shipping,
4The high costs of hiring articulate salespeople probably accounts for why such practices are usually
restricted to retailers selling fairly expensive products like cars, appliances, and mattresses.
2which allows products to be oﬀered at many diﬀerent prices. Another is that it is easier
for e-retailers to gather information about consumers and personalize prices. Each of these
practices can frustrate consumer price search.
Most people are still buying most items as they did before the Internet existed. To try
to get insights into what may happen in the future if price search engines do become very
popular we have chosen to examine an environent that is now very atypical. We call it
the Pricewatch universe. Pricewatch is an Internet price search engine that is popular with
relatively savvy people shopping for computer parts. Its universe is inhabited by hundreds
of small, low-overhead retailers. They attract consumers largely just by keeping Pricewatch
informed about their (low) prices.
Our informal evidence section describes various practices that we think of as forms of
obfuscation. Some of these are as simple as making product descriptions complicated and
creating multiple versions of products so that consumers have to examine the attributes
and prices of a large number of products to know what is being oﬀered. We particularly call
attention to a practice that has become ubiquitous in the Pricewatch universe: ﬁrms oﬀer
an (ineﬃciently) low quality product at a very low price to attract customers and then try
to talk consumers who visit the site into paying extra to get the product they really want.
For example, the retailer we study lists very low prices on Pricewatch for “bare” CPUs, and
then tries to convince consumers to instead purchase a CPU with an attached cooling fan.
We will refer to this practice as being a “loss-leader strategy” even though it sometimes
diﬀers from the classic loss-leader strategy in two respects: it may involve getting consumers
to upgrade to a superior product rather than getting them to buy both the loss-leader and
a second physical good; and the “loss-leader” may be sold for a slight proﬁt rather than
at a loss. The model of Ellison (2003) we mentioned discusses why the adoption of such
practices (referred to there as “add-on pricing”) can be a means of obfuscation.
The majority of this paper is devoted to formal empirical analyses of the Pricewatch
universe. We address several questions via an analysis of demand and substitution patterns
within eight speciﬁc product categories: four categories of computer memory modules and
four categories of CPUs. We gather data from two sources. We obtained year-long hourly
price series by using Go!Zilla to repeatedly conduct price searches on Pricewatch in each
3of those eight product categories. We matched this to sales data obtained from a single
private ﬁrm that operates several computer parts websites and derives most of its sales
from Pricewatch referrals.
Our ﬁrst empirical result is a striking conﬁrmation of the hypothesis that price search on
the Internet may dramatically reduce search frictions and lead to extremely elastic demand.
We estimate that the ﬁrm faces a demand elasticity of between -25 and -40 for its lowest
quality memory modules! These are some of the largest demand elasticities we have seen
empirically estimated. For single product retailers they would lead to a “Bertrand paradox”
where the equilibrium price would be so low as to prevent retailers from covering their ﬁxed
costs.
Our second main empirical result can be regarded as a contribution to the empirics of
loss leaders. We show that charging a low price for a low quality product increases our
retailer’s sales of medium- and high-quality products. The reason why this happens is that
one cannot ask a search engine to ﬁnd “decent-quality memory modules sold with reasonable
shipping, return, warranty and other terms.” Hence, many consumers use Pricewatch to
do what it can do – ﬁnd the websites that oﬀer the lowest prices for any memory module
– and then search within a few of these websites to ﬁnd other products that better ﬁt
their preferences. This result (as well as our ﬁndings that website design appears to be a
critical determinant of the sucess of an e-retailer) may also be of interest to the marketing
literature, which has discussed loss leaders but does not contain clear empirical evidence of
their eﬀectiveness.
Our third main set of empirical results examine how it is that obfuscation aﬀects prof-
itability. Speciﬁcally, we explore predictions of the two speciﬁc obfuscation mechanisms
discussed in our theory section. In the search theoretic model, obfuscation raises proﬁts
by making consumers less informed. In the competitive price-discrimination model, ob-
fuscation raises proﬁts by creating an adverse-selection eﬀect makes ﬁrms less interested
attracting consumers via price cuts. We ﬁnd evidence of the importance of both mecha-
nisms: we ﬁnd that many consumers appear to have ended up with limited information;
and we ﬁnd that there is an important adverse selection problem that ﬁrms would want to
consider when contemplating a price cut.
4Finally, we examine an additional data source, cost data, for direct evidence that re-
tailers obfuscation strategies have been successful in raising markups beyond the level that
would otherwise be sustainable. Given the extreme price sensitivity of the demand for
low-quality products, a naive application of single-good markup rules would suggest that
equilibrium price-cost margins might be just 2.5% to 4%. We explain, using actual data in
an example, why this is not what one should have expected in light of our ﬁndings about the
adverse selection eﬀect in demand. We ﬁnd that the average markup on memory modules
is actually about 12%. Pets.com could never have survived with a 12% markup, but this
should be ﬁne for our retailers. We conclude that the level of obfuscation on Pricewatch is
suﬃcient to enable active competition between eﬃcient retailers.
The most closely related study of price search engines and demand that we know of is
Brynjolfsson and Smith (2001). They use a dataset containing the click sequences of tens
of thousands of people who conducted price searches for books on Dealtime to estimate
several discrete choice models of demand.5 They note that book retailers appear to be
diﬀerentiated and identify price premia that consumers are on average willing to pay to
buy from branded retailers (Amazon, Barnes & Noble, and Borders) and from retailers
they have patronized in the past.6 The one study of e-retail we know of that reports
demand elasticities is Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003), which estimates elasticities for book
sales at Amazon and Barnes & Noble. They collected data on books’ sales ranks at the two
sites before, during, and after an Amazon pricing experiment, and then estimated demand
elasticities by inferring sales from the data on sales ranks.
Two other studies have provided some evidence on the link between Internet search and
price levels. Brown and Goolsbee note that Internet sites comparing life insurance premia
appeared in 1996 and term life insurance premia fell 12% in 1996 and 8% in 1997, mostly
falling for those with higher predicted Internet usage. Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer and Silva-
Risso (2001, 2003) report that people who received dealer referrals from Autobytel.com
(which does not itself provide any price comparison capabilities) paid 1% or 1.5% less for
5A disadvantage of their dataset is that they do not observe purchases and must use last clickthroughs
as a proxy.
6They do not report price elastiticies, but they could presumably easily be derived from their estimates
and reported separately for branded and generic online bookstores.
5their new cars than did other customers who bought comparable cars. Finally, a number
of studies have examined price dispersion at e-retailers. See, for example, Clay, Krishnan
and Wolﬀ (2002) and Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2003).
2 Theory of price search engines; search and obfuscation
We begin this section with a high-level model that brings out a basic intuition for why
search engines may want to reduce search frictions and retailers to increase them. We then
discuss a couple ways in which one could model search and obfuscation more concretely.
Any model of price search engines must avoid two possible contradictions. The ﬁrst is
the Bertrand paradox. A price search engine that caused all retailers to go out of business
would be of little use. The second is what we will call the search engine revenue paradox. If
a price search engine creates Bertrand-like competition, then retailers cannot pay the search
engine because they are making no proﬁts, and consumers will not pay the search engine
because if there is no price dispersion they can just go directly to any retailer. We note that
it is easy to avoid these paradoxes if the search engine has adequate pricing instruments.
Consider a retail sector consisting of a large number of ﬁrms selling a single undiﬀer-
entiated product. Suppose that the only way that retailers can reach consumers is via a
monopoly price search engine. The search engine can monitor sales that are made as a
result of its searches and charge retailers a referral fee of r for each sale made.7 Suppose
that the outcome of the price competition game between the listed retailers depends on two
parameters: the wholesale price w at which retailers acquire the good and a parameter s
that we call the level of “search frictions.” Assume that aggregate sales in this equilibrium
are Q∗(w,s) and aggregate retailer proﬁts are πr(w,s). Assume that these functions are




∂s < 0, ∂πr
∂w < 0 and ∂πr
∂s > 0.8
7Yahoo! Shopping, for example, charges retailers 2% of their gross revenues on any sales made during
the course of a browser session in which the consumer was referred to the website by Yahoo! Shopping.
8The one condition where one would expect “for small s” to bind most quickly is the last one, but given
the elasticities we report, we feel comfortable assuming that the ﬁrms in our data would prefer somewhat less
eﬃcient search. A main observation of Diamond’s (1971) search model is that proﬁts can be discontinuous
and jump to the monopoly price with a positive search cost. A large subsequent literature has explored
variants of the model in which intermediate search costs lead to intermediate outcomes. See Varian (1980),
Burdett and Judd (1983) and Stahl (1989). Bakos (1997) and Janssen and Moraga (2000) examine the
eﬀects of search costs on prices and welfare. Bakos examines a model with horizontally diﬀerentiated ﬁrms
where consumers must pay a search cost to learn a ﬁrm’s location as well as its price and notes that lower
6Assume that prices converge to marginal cost as s goes to zero so Q∗(w,0) = D(w) and
πr(w,0) = 0.
Suppose for now that the price search engine can costlessly choose any level of search
frictions s. Write c for the cost at which retailers acquire the good that they sell. The
problem facing the search engine is now
Maxr,s rQ∗(c + r,s).
Given that Q∗ is decreasing in s the optimal choice is to eliminate all search frictions (i.e.,
set set s = 0). The search engine’s problem is then simply the standard monopoly pricing
problem,
Maxp(p − c)D(p),
where p ≡ c + r. The search engine sets r = pm − c and gets the full monopoly proﬁt.
Retailers earn zero proﬁts. This illustrates our ﬁrst observation, that search engines would
like to reduce frictions.
Our resolution to the search engine revenue paradox is that as long as search engines
can charge per sale referral fees, ﬁrms pass the referral fees on to consumers and search
engines can collect their revenues from retailers.9 The model does have the Bertrand-
paradox problem if retailers have ﬁxed costs. In this case a couple of solutions would be
natural: the search engine could make ﬁxed payments to the retailers to cover their ﬁxed
costs, or, if that is not feasible, the search engine could choose the minimal level of search
frictions that would let the retailers recover their ﬁxed costs.
Now consider a model in which search engines and retailers must make costly invest-
ments to increase or decrease search frictions. Search frictions will then typically not be
eliminated, and the eﬀect of technological progress on the level of search frictions is in-
determinate. This is our second observation. For example, the simplest balance-of-power
game would have the search engine choose an investment level xse at cost g(xse;θ) while
search costs lead to lower prices and improved match quality. Janssen and Moraga examine a Stahl-style
model with undiﬀerentiated products and two types of consumers and emphasize that in some cases prices
may be higher with lower search costs.
9As in the literature on vertical restraints, there may be many other contracts that could be used to
extract the monopoly proﬁts. For example, the search engine could refuse to post any price below the
monopoly price and charge each retailer a ﬁxed fee equal to its expected market share times the monopoly
proﬁt.
7retailers simultaneously choose xr at cost h(xr;θ), resulting in the level of search frictions
being s0 −xse +xr. The parameter θ indexes the state of technology. Whether increases in
θ increase or decrease equilibrium search frictions in a model like this is obviously indeter-
minate: it depends on whether the technology aids search-improving or search-obfuscating
more.
A couple variants of the model are worth mentioning. First, suppose the the search
engine could also charge ﬁxed fees. It would then charge a ﬁxed fee of πr(s∗) − h(x∗
r;θ)
to extract the retailers’ proﬁts. As long as the ﬁxed and referral fees were chosen in a
stage prior to when the x’s were chosen, the determination of equilibrium search frictions
would be unchanged—the only diﬀerence would be that the retailers’ eﬀorts at obfuscation
would just help them achieve a zero proﬁt. Second, suppose that there were multiple search
engines competing to attract consumers. In a model with diﬀerentiation between search
engines ´ a l` a Hotelling, the degree of diﬀerentiation determines the utility consumers receive.
The search engines will want to provide this utility level in the most eﬃcient way possible.
In many models this would give search engines an incentive to reduce search frictions and
also lead them to charge lower referral fees than in the monopoly model.
The only full models of price search engines we are aware of are those of Baye and
Morgan (2001, 2003). They do not consider the possibility of charging referral fees. They
nonetheless avoid the revenue paradox. The key insight is that diﬀerences from the Bertrand
model that one might think are trivial—the presence of an outside option for retailers
and/or positive listing fees—make the standard argument that the Bertrand game has no
mixed strategy equilibria inapplicable. It turns out that the model has a symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium in which ﬁrms randomize both over whether to list and over the prices
to choose if they do. Both retailers and consumers are willing to pay positive ﬁxed fees to
the search engine.
2.1 Incomplete consumer search
The model above treats “search frictions” very abstractly. How might one construct more
concrete micro models in which search frictions are determined by competing investments
by search engines and retailers?
8One way would be to build on a standard search model. Stahl (1989), for example,
considers a model with two types of consumers. A fraction µ enjoy searching for low prices
and always learn the prices oﬀered by all retailers (of which there are a ﬁnite number).
A fraction 1 − µ incur a cost of c for every price quote they obtain. Consumers are oth-
erwise identical and have downward sloping demands. Stahl notes that this model has a
unique symmetric equilibrium: retailers randomize over prices in some interval; informed
consumers purchase from the ﬁrm oﬀering the lowest price; and the other consumers pur-
chase from the ﬁrst store they visit provided that its price is below some threshold (which it
always is in equilibrium). The solution is continuous in µ and varies in the manner assumed
above if we deﬁne s ≡ 1−µ: retailer proﬁts are lower and demand is higher (in a ﬁrst order
stochastic dominance sense) when the fraction of informed consumers is higher, and price
converges to cost in the limit as µ goes to one.10
Building on this model, one could provide an explicit model of search frictions by assum-
ing that consumers are heterogeneous in their ability to digest the information presented on
a webpage. The search engine’s investment xse would be an investment in collecting infor-
mation and presenting it in a manner that is easier to understand. Retailers’ investments
xr would be investments in making pricing more complicated and diﬃcult to describe. To
ﬁt the model above exactly, one could assume that the distribution of consumer abilities is
such that after these investments are made, a fraction µ0 + xse − xr of consumers are able
to understand the webpage fully and thereby learn all ﬁrms’ prices, whereas the rest of the
consumers cannot understand the price information at all and must resort to visiting the
listed websites sequentially (in a random order) to understand each retailer’s price.11 The
analysis of the search and obfuscation game would then follow exactly as described above.
In any interior equilibrium, the model will exhibit positive retail markups, price dispersion
across retailers, and limited knowledge of prices by some consumers.
10The solution has similar comparative statics in the c parameter, so one could alternately take s ≡ c as
the measure of search frictions. There are a number of search models in the literature, but Stahl’s model
stands out for having intuitively appealing comparative statics.
11Stahl’s (1996) paper extends the model to allow for heterogeneity in search costs among the consumers
with positive search costs, so that some of the partially informed consumers will learn many prices whereas
others learn just one or a few.
92.2 Add-ons and adverse selection
Ellison (2003) describes an alternate approach to obfuscation in which obfuscation raises
retailer proﬁts even though consumers either observe or correctly anticipate every retailer’s
price. The model (as one would reinterpret it to ﬁt the search and obfuscation applica-
tion) involves two retailers, which are slightly diﬀerentiated ´ a l` a Hotelling. Consumers are
heterogeneous both in their preferences over the two ﬁrms and in their marginal utilities
of income. The ﬁrms are assumed to sell a standard good that provides v utils (minus
transportation costs) to each consumer. They are also able to sell a damaged good that
provides only v − w utils.12 Critically, consumers can distinguish the damaged good from
the original, but the search engine cannot. For example, if the search engine is not de-
signed to collect and display shipping details the damaged good could be an oﬀer to sell the
standard good accompanied by ﬁne print stating that the shipping time will be one month.
Because the search engine cannot distinguish between the damaged and the standard good,
in equilibrium all listings will be for the damaged good. Each retailers’ website will also
contain a separate higher price for the undamaged goods, and consumers will need to incur
the cost of visiting each retailer’s website to learn what these “add-on” prices are. As in
Diamond (1971), the structure of the search costs makes the price of the add-on very high:
retailers charge the monopoly price for the incremental value of the standard good over the
damaged good. Consumers with rational expectations anticipate this and in equilibrium
are fully informed: they directly observe each ﬁrm’s price for the damaged good and cor-
rectly infer the prices that are not posted. Proﬁts earned on the add-on may therefore be
partially or completely competed away in the form of lower prices for the listed goods.
The interesting case of the model occurs when the amount of damage w and the het-
erogeneity in consumers’ marginal utilities of income lead some consumers to upgrade to
the undamaged good while others settle for the damaged good to save money. Notably,
the ﬁrms’ proﬁts are higher when they compete by listing damaged good prices than they
would be if the damaged good did not exist or if the search engine were able to distinguish
damaged and undamaged goods. Moreover, the equilibrium proﬁts are increasing in the
12See Deneckere and McAfee (1996) for more on damaged goods.
10amount of damage w. An intuition for the basic result is that when the ﬁrms sell damaged
goods, they create an adverse selection problem that makes ﬁrms hesitant to undercut each
other: a price cut will disproportionately attract cheapskates who buy the damaged good
at a low price (which is sometimes below cost).
One could provide a second explicit model of “search frictions” by deﬁning s ≡ w
and considering a game in which the search engines invest in developing software that can
recognize and inform consumers about diﬀerent forms of damage, thereby reducing w, while
retailers invest in inventing new and creative ways to damage products, thereby increasing
w. This model would not exactly ﬁt in the general framework described above for two
reasons. First, it needs some diﬀerentiation so prices will not drop all the way to cost as
search frictions vanish. Second, the higher prices that search frictions bring do not actually
reduce the quantity sold because consumers are assumed to have unit demands up to a
choke price that is not binding in equilibrium. The ﬁrst should not matter for the search
and obfuscation game. The second is important. A slight modiﬁcation of the model would,
however, both make it more realistic and make it ﬁt within the general framework: one
would just need to make the consumers’ demands downward sloping.13
3 The Pricewatch universe; memory modules and CPUs
We study a segment of e-retail largely mediated by a price search engine called Pricewatch.
The Pricewatch universe is characterized by a large number of small, undiﬀerentiated e-
retailers selling memory upgrades, CPUs, and other computer parts. The customers include
hobbyists building computers, IT support people, gamers, and other relatively savvy users
upgrading old computers, and proprietors of small computer stores. The retailers tend to
do little or no adversiting, to have rudimentary websites, to receive no venture capital, and
to run eﬃcient, proﬁt-maximizing operations. We assume that they receive a large fraction
of their customers through Pricewatch.
One can use Pricewatch to locate a product in one of two ways. One can either type a
13The unit demands in Ellison’s model are primarily there for tractability and to provide a neat contrast
by making add-on pricing completely irrelevant when there is less consumer heterogeneity. The best way to
construct a tractable model without unit demands might be to build on the model around logit demands as
in Verboven (1999) rather than around the Hotelling model.
11technical product description, such as “Kingston PC2100 512MB,” into a search box, or one
can run through a multilayered menu to select one of a number of predeﬁned product cat-
egories, e.g., clicking on “System Memory” and then on “PC133 128MB SDRAM DIMM.”
We believe that the latter is much more common. Pricewatch returns a list of products
sorted from cheapest to most expensive in a twelve-listings-per-page format. Note that
running through the menu leads to predeﬁned, not user-deﬁned, product categories, and
that some of these categories contain as many as 350 listings from 100 diﬀerent websites.
The categories inescapably encompass products of varying quality, often including products
made by higher and lower quality manufacturers and always including oﬀers in which the
product is bundled with diﬀerent levels of service. Typically, the ﬁrst several pages of a list
would contain only low quality oﬀerings, the higher quality products at reasonable prices
buried deep within the list of 350 products. Figure 1 contains the ﬁrst page of a typical
list, that for PC100 128MB memory modules from October 12, 2000. The low prices listed
on Pricewatch are very low. For example, in the period we study, generic memory modules
are typically oﬀered for about one-half of the price that Dell charged for a Dell-branded
product.
People who have not seen previous studies about price dispersion might think that it
is remarkable that there are so many diﬀerent prices listed for nearly identical items on
Pricewatch. In comparison with previous studies, however, we think it is remarkable that
prices are so close together. In the early part of our data when a 128MB PC100 memory
module sold for about $100, the average diﬀerence between the lowest listed price and the
12th lowest listed price was about $8. Figure 2 illustrates the range over the course of the
year.
Prices for most computer components have declined sharply. Retail prices for memory
modules, for example, dropped from about $100 per megabyte at the start of 1990 to about
10 cents per megabyte in September of 2003. Memory prices are also volatile. In Figure 2,
for example, we see that although prices declined by about 70% over the course of the year,
there are two periods of sharp price increases. Prices rose by about 50% between late May
and early July 2000 and by about 25% in less than two weeks in November 2000. Prices
for CPUs are less volatile and decline in a more orderly fashion.
12A fascinating aspect of the Pricewatch lists (which greatly aids our econometric analysis)
is the substantial turnover from day to day and even from hour to hour. On average, three
of the twenty-four retailers on the ﬁrst two pages of the above-mentioned list will change
their prices in a given hour. Each price change typically moves several other retailers up
or down one place on the list. Some websites are clearly big players that regularly occupy
a position near the top of the Pricewatch list. From time to time one may observe a ﬁrm
sitting in the ﬁrst position for a week or more, but there is no rigid hierarchy.
Some of this turnover can be attributed to the technology used by Pricewatch and the
various websites at the time. Pricewatch is a database-based system which relies on retailers’
updating their own prices in its database. Our impression is that all (or almost all) of the
retailers were setting prices in Pricewatch manually in the time period we study. A typical
retailer has dozens or hundreds of products listed in the Pricewatch database, making it
impractical to constantly monitor one’s place in each predeﬁned product category and the
current wholesale prices for each product. Instead, a retailer might manually examine its
position on the most important Pricewatch categories a few times a day and might look at
current wholesale prices once or twice a day.
Our sales and cost data come from a ﬁrm that operates several websites selling computer
components in the Pricewatch environment. We will examine the pricing of and demand
for their products within eight product categories (each of which corresponds to a popular
predeﬁned search on Pricewatch): PC100 memory modules in both 128MB and 256MB;
PC133 memory modules in both 128MB and 256MB; and AMD Athlon processors in 650
MHz, 700 MHz, 750 MHz, and 800 MHz. In each of these categories, our ﬁrm oﬀers a
number of products with varying quality levels, typically three.
The ﬁrst part of each memory module description, PC100 vs. PC133, refers to the
speed with which the memory communicates with the CPU. PC133 memory is better and
costs about the same. Despite this, sales of the two speeds of memory are comparable,
because the speed of a memory module must match the speed of a computer’s CPU and
motherboard. In the period we study, people who were upgrading old computers more
often needed to buy PC100 memory. Hobbyists building new computers usually wanted to
13build systems around AMD Athlon CPUs that required PC133 memory. The second part
of the product description is the capacity of the memory in megabytes. Many consumers
can substitute two 128MB modules for one 256MB modules, although some with older
motherboards could not use the “high density” 256MB modules found at the top of the
Pricewatch list and some consumers would be slot constrained. The 256MB modules are
about twice as expensive. Typically, one spends about $100 on memory when building an
inexpensive computer. In the summer of 2000 when 256MB modules cost about $250 most
of the demand at Pricewatch was for 128MB modules. In the spring of 2001 when 256MB
modules cost about $60, the two were about equally popular.
The retailer that provided us with sales data sells three diﬀerent products within each
Pricewatch memory category on each of its websites, e.g., each website sells three diﬀerent
PC100 128MB memory modules, diﬀerentiated by quality of the DRAM and the board as
well as by contract terms. Figure 3 illustrates how a similar quality choice is presented to
consumers on a website that copied site A’s design. Making quality comparisons within a
website is much easier than making comparisons across websites: many memory modules are
unbranded and sites often contain minimal technical speciﬁcations. In this regard shopping
for a memory module can be similar to shopping for mattresses.
The other set of products we study are AMD Athlon processors. Since an AMD Athlon
processor is a branded product, a “bare” Athlon with a given clock speed purchased from
any website should be identical to a bare Athlon purchased from any other website. The
primary purchasers of Athlon CPUs were hobbyists (or proprietors of small computer stores)
building new computers. CPUs come in many clock speeds. In early June 2000 prices ranged
from about $120 for a 500 MHz Athlon to over $1000 for a 1000 MHz Athlon (which was
not yet widely available). A typical way to make the speed vs. price tradeoﬀ would be to
spend one-fourth of one’s total budget for a computer on the CPU. Pricewatch’s predeﬁned
categories recognize that one should compare prices for processors with the same clock
speed. We will examine prices and demand within four of the categories that were most
popular in the summer of 2000: the 650 Mhz, 700 MHz, 750 MHz, and 800 MHz. Typical
prices for these CPUs ranged from $140 for the 650 MHz Athlon to $280 for the 800 MHz
Athlon.
14Despite the fact that the 650 MHz Athlon is a branded product, oﬀerings within the
650 MHz category fail to be homogeneous for two reasons. First, diﬀerent retailers oﬀer
diﬀerent levels of service. Second, CPUs are often purchased together with a retailer-
installed fan/heatsink. One can buy a decent quality fan/heatsink combination for about
$5 and an experienced installer can attach it to the CPU in less than a minute. The
attachment can be tricky for a novice, though, and entails a nontrivial chance of ruining
the CPU. Retailers may oﬀer to attach any of several fans, and each CPU-fan combination
should be viewed as a distinct product within the same Pricewatch category. For example,
one of the websites from which we have data typically oﬀers three products within each
category: a bare CPU, a CPU attached to an AMD-approved fan, and a CPU together
with a premium-quality fan (and also bundled with better service terms and an extended
warranty). To reiterate, Pricewatch’s categories did not distinguish between CPUs with
and without fans (or with better or worse fans), so all of these products would appear in
the same Pricewatch list.
4 Observations of obfuscation
Over the last few years Pricewatch has made a number of enhancements to combat obfus-
cation. Practices that frustrate search nonetheless remain commonplace.
One of the most visible search-and-obfuscation battles was fought over shipping costs.
In its early days Pricewatch did not collect information on shipping costs and sorted its
lists purely on the basis of the item price. Shipping charges grew to the point that it was
not uncommon for ﬁrms to list a price of $1 for a memory module and inform consumers
of a $40 “shipping and handling” fee when they went to check out. Pricewatch fought this
with a two-pronged approach: it mandated that all ﬁrms oﬀer UPS ground shipping for a
fee no greater than a Pricewatch-set amount ($11 for memory modules); and it added a
column to its listing pages that either displayed the shipping charge (if the retailer reported
it) or a warning that customers should be wary of stores that do not report their shipping
charges.14 Many retailers adopted an $11 shipping fee for memory modules in response, but
uncertainty about the cost of UPS ground shipping was not completely eliminated because a
14Our empirical work is based on data from the period when these policies were in eﬀect.
15number of retailers left the column blank or (more commonly) reported a range of shipping
charges. The meaning of “UPS ground shipping” was also subject to manipulation: one
company explicity stated on its website that items ordered with the standard UPS ground
shipping were given lower priority for packing than other orders and might take two weeks to
arrive. More recently, Pricewatch mandated that retailers provide it with shipping charges
and switched to sorting low-price lists based on shipping-inclusive prices (which are based
on the maximum shipping charge if a range is given). This appears to have worked as
desired, although it only provides the desired information for customers who prefer ground
shipping: customers who wish to upgrade to 3rd-, 2nd-, or next-day air must look through
the retailers’ websites manually.
One of the potential models of obfuscation we discussed involved ﬁrms’ trying to increase
customers’ inspection costs and/or to reduce the fraction of customers who will buy from
the ﬁrm on the top of the search engine’s list without doing any ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm searching. We
observed several practices that might serve this purpose. The most eﬀective seems to be
bundling low-quality goods with unattractive contractual terms, like providing no warranty
and charging a 20% restocking fee on all returns. Given the variety of terms we observed,
it would seem unwise to purchase a product listed on Pricewatch without reading the ﬁne
print. Another is making advertised prices diﬃcult to ﬁnd. In 2001 it took us quite a bit of
time to ﬁnd prices listed on Pricewatch on several retailers’ sites. In a few cases, we never
found the listed prices. Several other ﬁrms were explicit that Pricewatch prices were only
available on telephone orders. Given that phone calls are more costly for the retailers, we
can only assume that ﬁrms either wanted people to waste time on hold or intended to make
them sit through sales pitches. Pricewatch has fought these practices in several ways. For
example, it added a “buy now” button, which (at least in theory) takes customers directly
to the advertised product.
The second obfuscation mechanism we discussed is the adoption of a “loss-leader” or
“add-on” pricing scheme: damaged goods are listed on the search engine at low prices and
websites are designed to convince customers attracted by the low prices to upgrade to a
higher quality product. Such practices are now ubiquitous on Pricwatch. Figure 3 is one
example. Customers who try to order a generic memory module from Buyaib.com at the
16price advertised on Pricewatch.com are directed to this page. It illustrates several ways
in which the low priced product is inferior to other products the company sells (at higher
markups). Figure 4 is another example. A consumer who tries to order a generic module
from Tufshop.com is taken to this page, from which a number of complementary products,
upgrades, and services. The ﬁgure presents the webpage as it initially appears. To avoid
purchasing the various add-ons the consumer must read through the various options and
unclick several boxes. After completing this page, a Tufshop.com customer is taken to
another on which he or she must choose from a long list of shipping options. These include
paying $15.91 extra to upgrade from UPS ground to UPS 3-day, $30.96 extra to upgrade
to UPS 2-day, and $45.96 extra to upgrade to UPS next day.15
Our impression is that the practices are also consistent with the add-on pricing model
in terms of the low-priced goods being of ineﬃciently low quality. In Pricewatch’s CPU
categories all of the listings on the ﬁrst few pages were bare CPUs. We are told that most of
the “generic modules” at the top of Pricewatch’s memory lists are very low quality products
that are much more likely to have problems than are other modules that can sometimes be
purchased wholesale for just one or two dollars more. We know that the wholesale price
diﬀerence is occasionally so small as to induce the retailer from which we got our data
to ship “medium quality” generic modules to customers who ordered low quality modules
(without telling the customers) because it felt the time cost and hassle of dealing with
returns was not worth the cost savings.
Obfuscation could presumably take many forms in addition to those we outlined in
our theory section. One is that ﬁrms could try to confuse boundedly-rational consumers.
Presumably, this would involve either tricking consumers into paying more for a product
than it is worth to them or altering their utility functions in a way that raises equilibrium
proﬁts.16 Our impression is that many Pricewatch e-retailers sites’ are intentionally con-
fusing. For example, whereas several sites will provide consumers with product comparison
15The incremental costs to Tufshop of the upgraded delivery methods are about $4, $6, and $20.
16Following our work on obfuscation, Gabaix and Laibson (2004) have developed a model of consumer
confusion. They assume confused consumers behave exactly as if they had stronger idiosyncratic preferences
for one ﬁrm relative to the other in a standard horizontal diﬀerentiation model. Hence, an analysis of
pricing and incentives to invest in confusing consumers is identical to an analysis of ﬁrms that can invest
in diﬀerentiation. Welfare consequences are diﬀerent, however, because the idiosyncratic factors that make
consumers prefer product A over product B are not preferences that contribute to utility.
17lists like that in Figure 3, we did not see any that augmented such a comparison with a
description of what “CAS latency” means to help consumers think about whether they
should or shouldn’t care about it.
As mentioned above, Pricewatch is a database-based facility that requires that retailers
enter their prices into a database. This scheme for running a price search website seems
to be gaining relative to the alternate technology of using shopbots to maintain a price
database or to search for prices in realtime whenever a consumer requests them. One
explanation for this must be that the shopbot approach can result in substantial delays
while the site searches. Another may be that the shopbot approach may be even more
prone to obfuscation. In 2001, for example, Yahoo! Shopping search engine should have
had a much easier time organizing products than a general search engine because it only
searched sites hosted by Yahoo. Yahoo collected a royalty on all sales made by merchants
through Yahoo! Shopping (as well as a monthly fee based on the number of items oﬀered
at a Yahoo! Store), so there must have been some standardization of listing and ordering
mechanics. Nonetheless, when we typed “128MB PC100 SDRAM DIMM” into the search
box and sorted on price, the ﬁve lowest listed prices were from merchants who had ﬁgured
out how to get Yahoo! Shopping’s search engine to think the price is zero even though a
human who clicks over to the retailer can easily see the price (and see that it is 50-100%
above the Pricewatch price). The next hundred or so cheapest items on Yahoo’s search
results were also either products for which Yahoo’s search engine had misinterpreted the
price or items which were inexpensive because they were not the desired product.17
5 Data
Our price data were downloaded from Pricewatch.com. They contain information on the
twelve (sometimes twenty-four) lowest price oﬀerings within each of the eight predeﬁned
17In 2001 it was possible to use Yahoo! Shopping’s search engine to get a well-sorted list and ﬁnd low
prices if one was experienced with it. In 2003 Yahoo! Shopping’s search engine conducts a broad search
not restricted to Yahoo! Shops and aﬃliates. The list returned in response to a corresponding search no
longer begins with a large number of sites that Yahoo thinks have zero prices, but it does begin with a large
number of sites for which it has incorrectly parsed the HTML and inferred the price to be less than it truly
is. Most of these mistakes appear to be accidental rather than due to a plan by the retailers to fool the
Yahoo! Shopping search engine.
18categories mentioned above.18 These data were collected at hourly frequency from May
2000 to May 2001.19 Recall that Pricewatch’s predeﬁned categories are somewhat coarse.
The vast majority of the products for which we downloaded prices are what we could call
“low-quality” products.
In addition to the price data for these “low-quality” products, we obtained price and
quantity data from one Internet retailer. The data contain the prices and quantities sold
for all products that ﬁt within the eight Pricewatch categories, often three diﬀerent quality
products in each category. The ﬁrm operates several diﬀerent (but similar) websites, which
typically have diﬀerent prices for the products studied.20 We use data from three websites,
which we will simply call A, B, and C.
The raw data are at the level of the individual order and indicate from which website the
customer made the purchase. We currently have approximately a year of sales data starting
in May of 2000. We aggregate the individual orders to produce daily sales totals for each
product at each website.21 Our primary price variables are the average transaction prices
for sales of a given product on a given day.22 We also record the daily average position of
each website on Pricewatch’s price ranked list.
The same Internet retailer also provided us with data on wholesale acquisition costs
for each product. The ﬁrm maintains very low inventories. Some products are purchased
from wholesalers every few days or once a week. Others are purchased almost every day.
The ﬁrm often has a “negative” inventory of the most popular memory modules, buying
them each afternoon to ﬁll the backlog of retail orders taken that morning and the previous
18We collected the twenty four lowest prices for the 128MB PC100 and 128MB PC133 memory modules
and the twelve lowest prices in each of the other six categories.
19We used Go!Zilla to carry out the downloads.
20Among the motivations for having several websites are that diﬀerent websites may be given diﬀerent
looks and consumers may have heterogeneous reactions, that it allows the websites to be more specialized
(which seems to be attractive to some consumers), that it facilitates experimentation, that it may help
promote private-label branded products, and that it lets the ﬁrm occupy multiple places on the Pricewatch
screen.
21Here, a “product” includes also the quality level, e.g., a high-quality 128MB PC100 module.
22Transaction prices are unavailable for products which have zero sales on a given day. If low-quality
products ever have zero sales, then we ﬁll the prices in using the listed prices from Pricewatch, since these
prices are quite volatile. Prices for the other products change less often and can be ﬁlled in fairly completely
by just assuming that prices are constant in the gaps between times when we observe identical transaction
price observations. We also ﬁll in a few other values by looking at when low-quality prices and prices at
other websites operated by the ﬁrm changed.
19evening. The data provided to us contain wholesale prices whenever the ﬁrm purchased a
particular product.23
Our analysis of memory module demand uses data from websites A and B. These two
websites have identical product lineups: they sell three products within each memory mod-
ule category, which we refer to as the low-, the medium-, and the high-quality module. Our
dataset on memory modules contains between 575 and 683 observations in each category.24
Summary statistics for each of the four categories are presented in Table 1. Note that the
data are at the level of the website-day, so the number of days covered is approximately half
of the number of observations. LowestPrice is the lowest price listed on Pricewatch (which
is presumably for a low-quality memory module.)25 Range1-12 is the diﬀerence between
the twelfth lowest listed price and the lowest listed price. Note that the price distribution is
fairly tight. PLow, PMid and PHi are the prices for the three qualities of memory mod-
ules at the two websites. PLowRank is rank of the website’s ﬁrst entry in Pricewatch’s
sorted list of prices within the category in question.26 This variable turns out to allow us to
predict sales much better than we can with simple functions of the cardinal price variables.
Note that the websites we study are consistently near the top of the Pricewatch list: the
average prices for the low-quality products they sell are within 10% of the average lowest
price on Pricewatch in all four categories. QLow, QMid and QHi are the average daily
quantities of each quality of module sold by each website. The majority of the sales are the
low-quality modules.
We have not broken the summary statistics down by website. Website A’s prices are
usually lower than website B’s, but there is no rigid relationship. For example, in the 128MB
23The only products purchased infrequently are CPU fans. This does not cause any substantial incom-
pleteness of the data because prices of CPU fans rarely change.
24Data are occasionally missing due to failures of the program we used to collect data and missing data
in the ﬁles the ﬁrm provided. We left gaps in the price curves in Figure 2 to indicate the frequency with
which we were missing data. The 256MB prices are missing for most of the last six weeks, so we chose to
use mid-March rather than May as the end of the 256MB samples.
25The Pricewatch data are hourly. Daily variables are constructed by taking a weighted average across
hours using weights that reﬂect the average hourly sales volumes of the websites we study.
26We only know a sites’ Pricewatch rank if it is among the 24 lowest priced websites for 128MB modules
or the 12 lowest priced websites for 256MB modules or Athlon processors. When a site’s price is too high
and it does not appear on the lists we downloaded from Pricewatch we set PLowRank equal to one one
more than the number of ﬁrms appearing on the lists we collected, i.e. 25 for 128MB modules and 13 for the
other products. In the 128MB category this happens for fewer than 1% of the observations. In the 256MB
category this happens for 3% of the site A observations and 14% of the site B observations.
20PC100 memory module category, website A’s low-quality price is lower on 251 days, the
same on 27 days, and higher on 60 days. In this category the price diﬀerences are usually
quite small, e.g. they are two dollars or less more than 70% of the time. In the 256MB
categories the price diﬀerences are somewhat larger: the median is ﬁve dollars. As one
would expect, Site A also has higher sales volumes. For example, it is responsible for about
70% of the sales of low-quality 128MB PC100 memory modules.
Our analysis of demand patterns for AMD Athlon processors uses data from websites B
and C. Athlon sales drop oﬀ sharply in the fall of 2000 following AMD’s introduction of the
improved Athlon Thunderbird. Accordingly, we analyze data from a shorter period, May to
November of 2000. An additional factor complicating the analysis is that sites B and C do
not have identical product lineups. Site C oﬀers three products within each processor-speed
category: the “low quality” product is usually a bare CPU (although the ﬁrm experimented
brieﬂy with selling a CPU with a nonapproved fan instead); the “medium quality” product
has an AMD-approved fan/heatsink attached; and the “high quality” product is a CPU
with a premium quality dual fan. Site B oﬀers two products in each category: the bare CPU
and the CPU with a dual fan. The fact that sites B and C have separate sets of oﬀerings
forces us to analyze site B’s sales and site C’s sales in separate regressions. The combination
of this and the shorter time period led us to pool data from the four clock-speed categories
and restrict the coeﬃcients to be identical across clock speeds except for additive clock-
speed dummies. Table 2 contains summary statistics for the Athlon processor data broken
down as it is used in the regressions. The ﬁrst panel refers to the data on site B’s sales and
the second to site C’s sales. The unit of observation is the clock speed-day. Hence, each
panel summarizes a dataset with four observations per day, and the mean prices reported
are averages across clock speeds. The minimum price of $105.25 for PLow on site B is what
a bare 650MHz Athlon cost near the end of the sample. The maximum price of $302.45 is
what a bare 800MHz Athlon cost near the start of the sample. The mean prices for PLow
and PHi in the website B data reﬂect that customers of website B would on average need
to pay about $39 more to get a CPU with a fan attached. Unit sales of CPUs are lower than
unit sales of memory modules. This will also reduce the precision of our estimates. The
fraction of consumers who buy upgraded products is a little higher than in the memory
21data: 39% of the customers of website B and 56% of the customers of website C buy a
medium- or high-quality product.
6 Demand patterns
In this section we estimate the demand elastiticies Pricewatch e-retailers face and examine
how consumers substitute between low-, medium-, and high-quality products. We do this
both to provide new descriptive evidence on the functioning of online markets and to provide
empirical evidence on the theories of obfuscation discussed above.
6.1 Methodology for demand estimation
Our primary interest is in how website w’s sales of low-, medium-, and high-quality products
depend on its prices for the three products and on its competitors’ prices. Speciﬁcally, we
suppose that within each product category c, the quantity of quality q products purchased
from website w on day t is
Qwcqt = eXwctβcq+uwcqt,
with
Xwctβcq = βcq0 + βcq1log(1 + PLowRankwct) + βcq2log(PMidwct) + βcq3log(PHiwct)




In this equation PLowRankwct is the rank of website w’s low-quality oﬀering on Price-
watch’s list of the lowest prices in category c. It is the primary variable that we use to
capture how website w’s low-quality price diﬀers from those of the other ﬁrms listed on
Pricewatch. PMidwct and PHiwct are the prices of website w’s medium- and high-quality
oﬀerings.27 The TimeTrend variables allow for a piecewise linear time trend with a slope
that changes every 30 days. We think of the fourth price variable, LowestPricect, mainly
as an additional control variable.28
27Medium- and high-quality cannot be deﬁned consistently across retailers. Accordingly, we have no data
on competitors’ prices for comparable products to include in the regressions.
28We do not treat the variable as providing an estimate of the elasticity of the aggregate demand at
all Pricewatch retailers as a function of their price because we lack data on prices at traditional retailers.
Interpretation would be even more diﬃcult in the medium- and high-quality demand regressions because
the coeﬃcient on LowestPrice will also reﬂect how decisions depend on medium- and high-quality prices
relative to low-quality prices.
22We estimate the demand equations via GMM. Speciﬁcally, for most of our estimates we
assume that the error term uwcqt satisﬁes E(euwcqt|Xwct) = 1 so that we can estimate the
models using the moment condition
E(Qwcqte−Xwctβcq − 1|Xwct) = 0
These estimates are done separately for each product category and each quality level. Stan-
dard errors were computed with a Newey-West style approach.
The coeﬃcients on the logs of the prices of the medium- and high-quality modules can
be directly interpreted as elasticities. To construct elasticities of demand with respect to
a website’s low-quality price, we treat log(1 + PLowRank) as a continuous variable and
compute estimated elasticities when all variables are at their means by setting the derivative
of PLowRank with respect to a change in PLow equal to the inverse of the average distance
between the twelve lowest prices.
This approach presumes that the price variables are not endogenous. Although we
present estimates in a later section that do not assume exogeneity of prices, these non-
instrumented estimates are our preferred ones for two reasons. First and most importantly,
we think that little of the variation in our e-retailers’ prices is due to its using information
about demand. The ﬁrm appears to have little information about whether particular days
or times might be good ones to be higher or lower on Pricewatch’s lists. Most of the
changes in our e-retailer’s ranks, in fact, are not due to any decisions: the e-retailer has
limited attention to devote to each of the dozens of Pricewatch lists on which its products
appear, and most rank changes are due to other ﬁrms changing their prices.
The person who sets prices noted in discussions with us that he would typically change
his low-quality prices for one of three reasons. First, a few times a day he checks some of
the Pricewatch lists and may raise or lower a price if a rank has drifted too far from where
he typically leaves it. Second, once a day or so he receives updated wholesale price lists
and may change a price in response to a wholesale price change. Third, he occasionally
raises prices if order-processing or shipping employees have failed to show up for work.
Less attention is paid to medium- and high-quality prices. These are typically left ﬁxed for
several weeks at a time.
23Second, given our assumed functional form for demand, economic theory implies that
prices should not be endogenous. In our demand model, shocks increase or decrease demand
multiplicatively. In such an environment, the proﬁt-maximizing price of a ﬁrm with constant
marginal costs is independent of the realization of the demand shock. Hence, prices set to
maximize proﬁts would not be endogenous even if the ﬁrm observed the demand shock
before setting its price.
Despite these arguments, we do also estimate our model using two distinct sets of
instruments for PLowRank, PMid, and PHi. These estimates are obtained from a GMM
estimation of the moment condition
E(Qwcqte−Xwctβcq − 1|Wwct) = 0,
where Wwct is a vector containing the instruments instead of the prices. We discuss this
estimation in section 6.5.
6.2 Basic results on demand
Table 3 presents estimates of demand from one of our product categories: 128MB PC100
memory modules. The ﬁrst column of the table contains estimates of the demand equation
for low-quality 128MB PC100 modules. The second and third columns contain estimates of
the demand for medium- and high-quality 128MB PC100 modules, respectively. Coeﬃcient
estimates are presented with t-statistics in parentheses below them.
Our ﬁrst main empirical result is that the demand for low-quality modules a website
faces is extremely price sensitive. This is due to a combination of two factors. First, a price
change of a few dollars can move a website up or down several places on the Pricewatch
list. Second, most people buying low-quality memory modules buy them from one of the
ﬁrst few ﬁrms on the Pricewatch list. The coeﬃcient estimate on the log(1 + PLowRank)
variable in the ﬁrst column implies that moving from from ﬁrst to second on the list reduces
a website’s sales of low-quality modules by 45% and dropping from ﬁrst to seventh reduces
sales by 87%.29 This feature of demand is remarkably clear in the data—we get a t-statistic
of 15.1 in a regression with only 683 observations.
29A move from ﬁrst to second increases log(1 + PLowRank) from from log(2) ≈ 0.69 to log(3) ≈ 1.1,
thereby reduces log-quantity by 1.48 ∗ 0.41 ≈ 0.6.
24Table 4 presents demand elasticities. The upper left number in the upper left panel
indicates that the 1.48 coeﬃcient estimate in the low-quality 128MB PC100 demand equa-
tion corresponds to an own-price elasticity of -25.0. In each of the other memory module
categories the corresponding elasticity is even larger. The estimates range from -33.0 in
the 128MB PC133 category to -41.4 in the 256MB PC133 category. These elasticities are a
powerful illustration of the potential that price search has to create a real Bertrand paradox.
The familiar Lerner index formula for equilibrium markups with competing single-product
retailers, (P − MC)/P = −1/η, implies that if retailers sold only low-quality products,
their markups over marginal cost would be 2.5% to 4%. Even eﬃcient, non-advertising
retailers would ﬁnd it diﬃcult to survive with such markups.
A second striking empirical result in Table 3 is that low quality memory is an eﬀec-
tive loss leader. In the second column of the table, note that the coeﬃcient on log(1 +
PLowRank) is negative and highly signiﬁcant. This means that controlling for the prices
a website charges for medium- and high-quality memory and for the lowest price at which
low-quality memory is available, it sells more medium-quality memory if its price for low-
quality memory is lower. Ordinarily one would expect the opposite relationship because
low- and medium-quality memory are subsititutes. Apparently, however, what many con-
sumers are doing is using Pricewatch to ﬁnd a set of websites oﬀering the lowest prices
for low-quality memory, clicking through to those websites to examine their oﬀerings fur-
ther, and then sometimes purchasing a higher quality product. The higher a ﬁrm is on the
Pricewatch list, the more such consumers it attracts. The loss leader eﬀect is very large.
The -0.76 coeﬃcient estimate indicates that moving from ﬁrst to seventh on the Pricewatch
list for (low-quality) 128MB PC100 memory reduces a website’s sales of medium-quality
128MB PC100 memory by 65%. The ﬁrst coeﬃcient in the third column indicates that
the loss-leader beneﬁts include sales of high-quality memory as well. The -0.41 coeﬃcient
indicates that moving from ﬁrst to seventh on the Pricewatch list for low-quality memory
would reduce high-quality memory sales by 43%.
Although it is common in marketing to talk about loss leaders, the empirical marketing
literature on the eﬀectiveness of loss leaders has produced mixed results (Walters, 1988;
Walters and McKenzie, 1988; Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi, 2000). We are not aware of
25any evidence nearly as clear our results.
A third noteworthy result is the fact that the coeﬃcients on the site B dummy are neg-
ative and signiﬁcant in all three regressions. They indicate that when the two sites charge
the same prices, site B sells substantially fewer memory modules. It is especially less suc-
cessful at selling high-quality memory modules. We ﬁnd this to be a striking demonstration
of the importance and diﬃculty of eﬀective website design. Website A and website B are
owned by the same ﬁrm. They were designed by the same people. They share the same
telephone operators and packing employees and hence provide exactly the same level of ser-
vice quality. A few attributes should make website B more attractive to some customers:
it had slightly lower shipping charges for part of the sample; it oﬀers a broader variety of
additional products that may be purchased at the same time; and at the time it had a
higher customer feedback rating at ResellerRatings.com. Nonetheless, it is not as eﬀective
at selling memory. One hypothesis the ﬁrm suggested to us is that some customers may
prefer to buy memory from a website (like site A) that specializes in memory.
The signiﬁcance levels in this table are similar to what we ﬁnd in the other memory
categories. The log(1 + PLowRank), Weekend, and SiteB variables are usually highly
signiﬁcant. The other variables are usually insigniﬁcant.
The one way in which the results for the 128MB PC100 category are unusual is that
the own-price elasticities of medium- and high-quality memory are precisely estimated. A
diﬃculty with our estimation strategy is that prices for medium- and high-quality memory
modules change infrequently. As a result, they are highly collinear with the ﬂexible time
trends that we have included in the model. This problem is particularly severe in the
256MB categories because the eﬀective sample size is reduced by the fact that most of the
memory is sold toward the end of the data period.
We report elasticity matrices for the other memory categories in Table 4, but to save
space we have not included full tables of demand estimates. The elasticity tables reveal that
we ﬁnd large own-price elasticities and large loss-leader beneﬁts consistently across cate-
gories. The ﬁnding of a negative coeﬃcient on SiteB is consistent, although the magnitude
varies somewhat. It is larger in some of the 256MB regressions.
Table 8 presents estimates of the demand for AMD Athlon CPUs sold through website
26C. The ﬁrst column gives parameter estimates of the demand for low quality (bare) CPUs.
The second column reports on the demand for the website’s medium-quality oﬀering: a
CPU with an AMD-approved fan attached. The third column reports on demand for the
website’s high-quality oﬀering: a CPU with a premium quality dual fan. The demand for
low-, medium-, and high-quality CPUs is quite similar to the demand for low-, medium-,
and high-quality memory modules in a number of ways. The demand for the low-quality
product is highly dependent on the website’s position on the Pricewatch list. (Moving
from ﬁrst to seventh is predicted to lower demand by about 80%. This corresponds to an
own-price elasticity of -27.7 for the low-quality product.) There is a signiﬁcant loss-leader
beneﬁt: when the ﬁrm’s price for a bare CPU puts it near the top of the Pricewatch list it
sells many more of the medium-quality CPU/fan combinations. For part of our sample the
ﬁrm sold a CPU with a non-AMD-approved fan rather than a bare CPU as its lowest-quality
product. It abandoned this experiment after just a few weeks because too many customers
were buying the low-quality product instead of upgrading. The coeﬃcient estimate on the
LowHasFan variable in the third column indicates that there is clear statistical evidence
that the alternate product lineup led to many fewer sales of CPUs with premium-quality
fans. As in many of the product categories the own-price elasticities of medium- and high-
quality products cannot be precisely estimated.
To save space we do not report estimates of the demand for CPUs through site B. The
estimates are qualitatively similar. The own price elasticity of site B’s low-quality oﬀering
(a bare CPU) is estimated to be -28.3.
6.3 The mechanics of obfuscation: incomplete consumer search
The ﬁrst explicit model of obfuscation we discussed in section 2 was Stahl’s model of
search with heterogeneous consumers. In Stahl’s model, consumers do not learn all prices.
We noted that any action that raised the cost of learning about each ﬁrm’s oﬀerings or
that forced more consumers to conduct ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm searches could be regarded as a form
of obfuscation. In this section we exploit a feature of our dataset to provide additional
evidence that consumers are not fully informed about the prices charged by the Pricewatch
retailers.
27Our data do not provide any easy way to see whether consumer learning about the
low-quality oﬀerings is incomplete. The market share advantage of ﬁrms ranked more
highly on the Pricewatch list could reﬂect that some consumers have not examined the
oﬀers by ﬁrms farther from the top of the list, but it could also be attributable purely
to price diﬀerences and idiosyncratic consumer preferences. The structure of our dataset
does, however, provides a nice opportunity to examine whether consumer learning about
higher quality products and prices is incomplete. We have data on two websites that oﬀer
identical products. If all consumers learned about each site’s prices for medium- and high-
quality memory, then we would expect that most of consumers buying medium-quality
memory from one of the two sites would buy it from the cheaper site. Diﬀerences between
low-quality prices should not help predict which site sells more medium-quality memory.30
To provide a straightforward analysis of how consumers medium- and high-quality mem-
ory choose between site A and site B we estimate simple logit models on the consumer-level
data using a dummy for whether each consumer chose to buy from site A (versus site B) as
the dependent variable. Formally, we assume each customer i choosing to buy a category
c quality q product from site A or site B at time t makes this choice to maximimize his
utility uiwcqt over the website w with
uiwcqt = β1 log(1 + PLowRankwcqt) + β2 log(Pwcqt) + β3TimeTrendt + ηcq + iw,
with ηcq a quality-category ﬁxed eﬀect and iw a standard logit error. The ﬁrst right-hand
side variable reﬂects a site’s position on the Pricewatch list for the category. The second is
the site’s price for the product that being purchased. Note that the estimated coeﬃcients
for diﬀerent product categories and diﬀerent quality levels are constrained to be equal (for
parsimony). If consumers are fully informed, one would expect that β1 would be zero and
that β2 would be negative.
The ﬁrst column of Table 7 reports estimates from a regression run on a dataset contain-
ing observations from all four memory categories and on both medium- and high-quality
30One could imagine that the coeﬃcient on log(1 + PLowRank) was signiﬁcant in the medium-quality
regressions we ran earlier, not because consumers were less than fully informed about prices, but only
because a site’s rank on the low-quality product is correlated with its rank on the medium-quality product
(which is not well-deﬁned and, therefore, not included in the regression). This alternate interpretation is no
longer possible when we study the relative shares of the two websites with identical products sold at prices
we know.
28modules. The coeﬃcients on log(1 + PLowRank) and log(P) are both signiﬁcant. The
standard deviation of the diﬀerence in log(1 + PLowRank) across websites is more than
ten times larger than the standard deviation of the diﬀerence in log(P), so the coeﬃcient
estimates can be thought of as indicating the a ﬁrm’s position on the low-quality Price-
watch list has a slightly stronger eﬀect than does its price for the item being purchased.
This suggests that there are a substantial number of consumers who are informed about
both sites’ prices and a substantial number who are not.
The second and third columns report estimates from the same regressions run separately
on medium-quality and high-quality memory modules. In both cases the results indicate
clearly that the low-quality module’s position on the Pricewatch list is an important deter-
minant of sales of medium- and high-quality modules. In the medium-quality case, we are
unable to ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence that the relative prices of medium-quality modules on
the two sites aﬀects where consumers buy them. In the high-quality case, the sites’ prices
for the high-quality products appear to be playing a more important role.
6.4 The mechanics of obfuscation: add-ons and adverse selection
The second explicit model of obfuscation we discussed in Section 2 was a variant on the
rational expectations add-on pricing model of Ellison (2003). In this model the practice of
posting prices for damaged goods and requiring consumers to visit a site to learn its prices
for higher quality goods raises prices even if consumers (in equilibrium) correctly anticipate
what each retailer’s prices for the higher quality goods will be. The main reason for this
is that adopting add-on pricing creates an adverse selection problem that discourages price
cutting: a ﬁrm that cuts prices will disproportionately attract cheapskates who are less
likely than other customers to buy higher-quality products.
In the section on basic results, we veriﬁed one implication of this model, that the low-
quality products were attracting customers who upgraded to the higher quality products, or,
in other words, that the low-quality products were eﬀective loss leaders. This was reﬂected
in negative coeﬃcients on log(1+PLowRank) in the medium- and high-quality regressions.
In this section, we examine the evidence on the theory’s more important prediction, that the
use of the add-on pricing creates an adverse selection problem (which would be expected to
29lead to higher prices). In our demand system, such an adverse selection problem would be
reﬂected in the coeﬃcient on log(1+PLowRank) being larger in the low-quality regression
than in the medium- and high-quality regressions. The larger coeﬃcient indicates that
lowering the price of the low-quality product would lead to a larger proportional increase
in low-quality sales than in medium- or high-quality sales. Table 6 reports the coeﬃcient
estimates on the log(1+PLowRank) variable in the seventeen demand regressions we ran:
three quality levels in each of the four memory module categories; three quality levels in
the regression examining CPUs sold through site C; and two quality levels in the regression
examining CPUs sold through site B.
In all cases, the pattern of the coeﬃcient estimates is consistent with the presence of an
adverse selection eﬀect. In every category (i.e. in every column of the table) the coeﬃcient
estimate from the low-quality regression is larger than the coeﬃcient estimates from the
medium- and high-quality regressions. Most of the diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant.
To oﬀer a sense of the magnitudes suggested by these coeﬃcient estimates, consider the
estimates from the 128MB PC100 column. A move from ﬁrst to third on the Pricewatch
list would result in 64%, 41%, and 25% decreases in unit sales of low-, medium-, and high-
quality modules, respectively. An alternative way for us to oﬀer intuition for the magnitude
of this adverse selection eﬀect (and a way to do so avoiding any worries about results being
driven by functional form assumptions) it to look at the ﬁrm’s quality mix using simple
sample means. For example, when site A or site B is ﬁrst on one of the Pricewatch lists for
256MB memory, 63% of its unit sales are low-quality memory. On days when one of them
is in tenth place, only 35% of the unit sales are low-quality memory.31.
Finally, we also ﬁnd Table 6 striking for the consistency of the estimates across product
catgories. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the six coeﬃcient estimates in the ﬁrst row
are identical. Nor can we reject the equality of the ﬁve estimates in the second row, nor of
the ﬁve estimates in the third row. Given that the products in the diﬀerent categories diﬀer
in price, that moving up or down one rank involves changing the item price by a diﬀerent
31Medium quality sales increase from 16% of total unit sales to 21% and high-quality sales from 21% to
40%. Total sales, of course, are much lower when the ﬁrm is in the tenth position so these “increases” are
decreases in unit sales of the higher quality products being oﬀset by even larger decreases of the low-quality
product
30number of dollars in the diﬀerent categories, and that the attributes that distinguish the
quality levels diﬀer between memory modules and CPUs, we ﬁnd this regularity intriguing.
6.5 Instrumental variables estimates
We have assumed so far that variation in a website’s rank on the Pricewatch list and in its
medium- and high-quality prices is exogenous. We have argued that this is a reasonable
assumption, but in this section will investigate the robustness of our conclusions to two
instrumental variables strategies.
We feel that there are two primary sources of exogenous variation in our websites’ prices
(relative to the prices of competing websites). First, because monitoring other ﬁrms’ prices
and changing one’s prices involves a time cost, the websites’ ranks on the Pricewatch lists
drift as other sites change prices during periods in which our ﬁrm is inattentive. Second,
the ﬁrm will raise or lower its prices in response to cost shocks. One source of such shocks
is unexpected employee absences that make it more diﬃcult to process a normal day’s
order ﬂow. Another is variation in the ﬁrm’s wholesale acquisition costs. The latter are
more common, but less clearly suitable for use as instruments because (1) they will not
lead to variation in a ﬁrm’s Pricewatch rank if wholesale prices for low-quality modules are
common to all ﬁrms; and (2) prices of other ﬁrms’ higher quality products are an omitted
variable that may be correlated with wholesale prices of medium- and high-quality memory
(especially in the medium- and high-quality demand regressions).
We have constructed two sets of instruments we will use to estimate demand for 128MB
PC100 memory modules, which we call “other speed” instruments and “cost” instruments.
The “other speed” instruments are the contemporaneous values of log(1 + PLowRank),
log(PMid), and log(PHi) for the same website but for a diﬀerent product, 128MB PC133
memory. These variables may reﬂect both sources of exogenous variation in PC100 memory
prices: the website’s ranks in the two categories could drift in unison during periods of
inattention; and if employees do not show up for work, the ﬁrm may raise its prices in all
product categories.32 If the demands for PC100 and PC133 memory are independent (recall
32Memory prices have a strong downward trend so a ﬁrm’s rank in each category will drift up during long
periods of inattention. In practice, the correlation is strong but far from perfect. In the 128MB PC100
category, for example, the R-squared of a regression of log(1 + PLowRank100) on log(1 + PLowRank133),
31that the products are not substitutes for most consumers), then the PC133 ranks would be
exogenous. The “cost” instruments for log(1+PLowRank), log(PMid), and log(PHi) are
derived from our data on the ﬁrm’s acquisition costs for low-, medium-, and high-quality
128MB PC100 memory modules.33 If the wholesale prices for low-quality memory our ﬁrm
faces are not perfectly correlated with the prices other ﬁrms face, then the low-quality
wholesale price should be correlated with the ﬁrm’s Pricewatch ranks.34
Table 8 reports estimates of the demand equations for 128MB PC100 memory modules
(comparable to those in Table 3) obtained using the two sets of instruments. In the ﬁrst
low quality regression (in the ﬁrst column of the table), the coeﬃcient estimate on the
log(1 + PLowRank) variable is unchanged and the variable remains highly signiﬁcant.
Again we ﬁnd that the demand for low-quality products is extremely price-sensitive. The
coeﬃcient estimates on the log(1+PLowRank) variable in the next two columns are reduced
from their values in the uninstrumented variables by about one-half. The standard errors
are substantially increased, failing to provide signiﬁcant evidence either that loss leader
eﬀects exist or that our previous estimates of the loss leader beneﬁt were too large. We
can, however, reject the hypothesis that the coeﬃcient estimates in the medium- and high-
quality regression are as large as the coeﬃcient estimate from the low-quality regression.
Hence, the results conﬁrm that the loss leader pricing creates an adverse selection problem.
The standard errors on the log(PMid) and log(PHi) variables are also increased.
Again, with the “cost” instruments, the log(1+PLowRank) variable remains signiﬁcant
in the low-quality regression conﬁrming our ﬁnding about extreme price-sensitivity. Again,
the other rank instruments, and the exogenous variables in the demand equation is 0.58. The coeﬃcient on
log(1+PLowRank133) has a t-statistic of 13. There is much less variation in log(PMid) and log(PHi) and
they can be predicted almost perfectly in such regressions, e.g. we get an R-squared of 0.995 in the 128MB
PC100 data.
33These data are only available on days on which the ﬁrm made wholesale purchases. Gaps of one or a
few days are common. We ﬁll in the missing data by interpolating linearly. The instruments for log(PMid)
and log(PHi) are simply the log of the cost of the cost of the product in question. Our instrument for
PLowRank is the log of a predicted rank obtained by adding a constant to what the ﬁrm’s rank would be
if it priced at cost.
34In practice, the cost-based instrument for PLowRank has predictive power, but less than the speed-
based instrument. In the 128MB PC100 category, for example, the R-squared of a regression of log(1 +
PLowRank) on the cost-based instruments and exogenous variables has an R-squared of 0.48 with the
t-statistic on the instrument being about ﬁve. The instruments for log(PMid) and log(PHi) again have
very strong predictive power, e.g. in the 128MB PC100 category we again get R-squareds above 0.99 in
ﬁrst-stage regressions.
32the coeﬃcients on this variable become insigniﬁcant in the other two columns leaving us
unable to say that the IV regressions provide additional support for our loss leader results.
The standard errors on the log(PMid) and log(PHi) variables become much larger. We
believe that this reﬂects that the instruments eliminate most of the true exogenous variation
in these variables (which comes from these prices gradually becoming higher relative to the
low-quality price in between adjustments and then being much smaller immediately after
adjustments).
7 Markups
This section examines price-cost margins. It has two motivations. First, the future of e-
retail depends on the balance between search and obfuscation. At one extreme, retail ﬁrms
would struggle to survive. At the other, search engines wouldn’t be worth using. Markups
provide descriptive information about how the battle is playing out in the Pricewatch
universe. Second, analyzing markups can provide a more complete understanding of the
mechanisms by which obfuscation aﬀects prices.
Table 9 presents our estimates of the actual markups. The table presents revenue-
weighted average percentage markups for each of the four categories of memory modules
and for CPUs sold through each of the two sites.35 The dollar markups were obtained
by adding the standard shipping and handling charge to the advertised item price, and
then subtracting the wholesale acquisition cost, credit card fees, an approximate shipping
cost, an estimate of marginal labor costs for order processing, packing, and returns, and an
allowance for losses due to fraud.36 In each category the sample period is that used in the
demand estimation, omitting observations from December 2000 (for which we do not have
cost data).
In the two 128 MB memory categories, the markups for low-quality products are slightly
negative. Prices have not, however, been pushed far below cost by the hope of attracting
customers who can be talked into upgrading. Markups are about 16% for medium-quality
modules, and about 27% for high-quality modules. Averaging across all three quality levels,
35The percentage markup is the percentage of the sale price, i.e. 100(p − mc)/p.
36The labor and shipping costs were chosen after discussions with the ﬁrm, but are obviously subject to
some error.
33markups are about 8% and 12% in the two categories. This corresponds to about ﬁve dollars
for a PC100 module and ten dollars for a PC133 module.
The ﬁrm’s average markups in the 256MB memory categories were higher: 13% and
16% in the two categories. Part of the diﬀerence is due to the fact that a higher fraction
of consumers buy premium quality products, but the largest part comes from the markups
on low-quality memory being substantially higher.37
Finally, the average percentage markups on Athlon CPUs are much lower: 3% at website
B and 6% at website C. The diﬀerence in markups is not as dramatic if one looks at them
in dollar terms. The average markups on CPUs at the two sites are about six and twelve
dollars, respectively. The largest part of the diﬀerence in average percentage markups is
due to markups on the upgraded CPU-fan combinations being lower than markups on high-
quality memory modules. Markups on low quality CPUs are also lower than markups on
low-quality memory modules.
An obvious question to ask is whether the markups reported above are what one would
expect under static Nash equilibrium pricing given the strength of the adverse selection
eﬀect we identiﬁed in the previous section. (There are, of course, many reasons for prices
to be higher or lower, such as repeated-game collusion or desire to build short-run market
share.) This, however, is something that one can not do with our demand estimates. One
reason is that we have not been able to obtain precise estimates of own-price elasticities for
medium- and high-quality products. A second is that the functional forms for demand we
are using are not well-behaved in some of the counterfactuals that must be considered when
doing a Nash equilibrium analysis. This is partially due to data limitations and partially
due to functional form choices we made in order to make the demand results easier to
interpret.38
37Part is also due to the sample period being diﬀerent. The revenue weighted estimates put a great deal
of weight on the latter part of the data. The 256MB data end 6 weeks before the 128MB data. Markups
on 128MB modules were relatively low in the last six weeks.
38Examples of unavoidable data limitations are that it is hard to separately identify the eﬀect of the
ﬁrm’s low quality price and its Pricewatch rank on demand since they are highly correlated and that there
is little variation in medium- or high- quality prices that is not collinear with the time trends. Examples
of choices we made include our use of a ﬁrm’s Pricewatch rank as the primary explanatory variable, which
is not appropriate if one wants to predict what would happen if the last ﬁrm on the list raised its price
toward inﬁnity, and the speciﬁcation of log(QLow) and log(QMid) as linear functions of log(PHi), which
implies that a ﬁrm could also earn unbounded proﬁts by setting PLow and PMid above cost and sending
34Although we cannot provide a structural analysis of markups, we think that we can pro-
vide evidence that the observed markups are roughly consistent with ﬁrms’ approximately
maximizing static proﬁts. We think that our demand system accurately reﬂects demand
at the prices one typically observes in the data. We therefore feel comfortable computing
projected proﬁts at prices charged in the data and can examine whether there appear to
be strong incentives to deviate from the actual prices to other prices in the same range.
Consider, for example, the prices from October 12, 2000 in Figure 1. The markups
on this day are fairly typical. Our retailer bought low-quality modules wholesale on the
previous day for $72.39 Shipping and handling charges are about $1 below the sum of actual
shipping costs and other marginal costs, so the lowest-priced ﬁrm, listing at $68, is selling
low-quality modules at about $5 below cost and the sixth ﬁrm, listing at $74, is at about $1
above cost. Given that the low-priced ﬁrms make many more sales, the quantity-weighted
average markup for low-quality modules is probably about -2%, which is just a little below
the sample mean. Site B’s markups on medium- and high-quality memory on that day were
also typical: the wholesale prices were $77 and $94, and it charged $103.49 and $148.50.
To illustrate the eﬀect on a ﬁrm’s proﬁts of moving positions on the Pricewatch list,
Table 10 contains results from a series of scenarios involving site B. In particular, it has
predicted quantities and predicted proﬁts for site B assuming site B had occupied each of
the twelve places on the list in Figure 1. Predicted sales of low-quality memory drop sharply
from 54.5 units if site B occupies the ﬁrst position to 3.4 units if it occupies the twelfth
position. Sales of high-quality modules decline much more gradually, from 2.8 units in the
ﬁrst position to 1.3 units in the twelfth. The sixth column reports estimates of site B’s
expected gross proﬁt from being in each position under the assumption that site B would
have used the wholesale prices from the previous day to calculate its costs. Site B would
most have liked to be in the ﬁfth position, where it would have expected to earn $154. Note
that proﬁts are fairly ﬂat over a wide range of markups. For example, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts in
the third and tenth positions are nearly equal. The one position that is clearly worse than
the others is the ﬁrst.
PHi toward inﬁnity.
39Given that the prices are from 9:01am Paciﬁc time, the $72 ﬁgure is likely to be the latest information
most ﬁrms had on costs before they set the observed prices.
35What would an -Nash equilibrium look like? The requirement is that no ﬁrm can gain
more than  by changing its price and moving to another location on the list. If markups
are too high this will fail because everyone will want to move to the top of the list, and if
they are too low it will fail because everyone will want to move to the bottom. At some
intermediate level, the losses that the top few ﬁrms incur selling low-quality modules below
cost could roughly oﬀset the proﬁts they derive from their greater sales of premium-quality
modules and thus we could have an -Nash equilibrium with price dispersion.
Although site B is not indiﬀerent between the various places on the list (and would
ﬁnd the ﬁrst position quite unattractive), we think of the proﬁt estimates in Table 10 as
suggesting that play is close to an -Nash equilibrium with a reasonable  for a few reasons.
First, proﬁts need not be exactly equal in equilibrium. They need only be close enough
to prevent deviations.40 Site B cannot switch its price to $74 and take the ﬁfth spot. It
can claim this spot only by charging $73, which would result in a proﬁt of $144 rather than
$154.
Second, heterogeneity in website design will lead to ﬁrms’ having diﬀerent preferences
over positions on the Pricewatch list. Recall that site A makes higher sales than site B
at the same prices, and is more successful in inducing customers to buy medium- and
high-quality memory. The seventh column of Table 10 reports estimates of site A’s gross
proﬁts. The ﬁfth position is also the most attractive for ﬁrm A, but its preferences over
the other positions are somewhat diﬀerent.41 In particular, it does relatively better in
the top few slots. This is consistent with our earlier observation that site A tends to set
lower prices than site B. Sites A and B have similar designs. Other websites that employ
diﬀerent tactics, e.g., requiring that consumers call on the phone and talk to salespeople,
may face quite diﬀerent demand functions. It does not seem unreasonable to suppose that
such heterogeneity might be able to account for why Computer Craft is willing to occupy
the top slot.
Third, cost heterogeneity will also contribute to ﬁrms having diﬀerent preferences over
40Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) provide several examples of how such “market impact eﬀects” can create
a multiplicity of asymmetric pure strategy equilibria.
41The attractiveness of the ﬁfth slot is due to an unusual feature of the prices in Figure 1. The ﬁfth-ranked
ﬁrm’s markup is a full four dollars above the markup of the third-ranked ﬁrm. This may be a situation
where our rank-based demand system is overestimating proﬁts.
36positions on the Pricewatch list. In addition to the standard cost heterogeneities, Price-
watch retailers may diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their expectations about wholesale prices. For
example, the most recent time prior to October 11th that our ﬁrm made a wholesale pur-
chase of low-quality memory was on Monday October 9th when it paid $78. Some of the
listed ﬁrms might not have checked wholesale prices since then, or might have made the
mistake of using acquisition costs rather than replacement costs when pricing inventory
acquired three days earlier. The eighth column of Table 10 lists the prices that site B
would have expected if it used the three-day-old costs. The ninth position is now the most
attractive. It is also true that many retailers would not shiporders received on the 12th
until the 13th or would wait until the 13th to replace shipped modules in inventory. It turns
out that before the end of the day on the 13th, low-quality modules could be purchased
wholesale for $68. The ﬁnal column of the table lists the proﬁts site B would have expected
if it had anticipated these lower costs. The ﬁrst position is now the most attractive. An-
other potential explanation for the top-ranked ﬁrm’s behavior is thus that it might have
had diﬀerent information about costs.
Fourth, the  in -Nash equilibrium would include monitoring and decision costs and
should not be thought of as extremely small. Our retailer, for example, has just one
manager. Monitoring dozens of Pricewatch lists is just a small part of his duties and he
does not have nearly enough time to make minor adjustments to every price every hour.
Hence, we should not expect to see all ﬁrms maximizing the proﬁts we calculated at all
times. Decision costs of some kind are necessary to account for the price inertia that is
present in the data. On October 12th, for example, the top six ﬁrms on the list in Figure
1 left their prices ﬁxed throughout the afternoon. The ﬁrst change to the top half of the
list came later in the day: Augustus Technology cut its price to $73 and took over the ﬁfth
spot.42
Although we think that the observed markups are roughly consistent with a static Nash
model of competition, two features of the data stand out as very hard to reconcile to such
a model. First, the markups for low-quality 256MB memory are higher than one would
42There were ﬁve other changes among ﬁrms lower on the list. The eighth-place ﬁrm raised its price
and left the top 12. Two other ﬁrms cut their prices to $76 to enter the ﬁrst page in the ninth and tenth
positions. Two other ﬁrms cut their prices to $77, one to enter the ﬁrst page and one to stay on it.
37predict even if one ignored the loss leader beneﬁts. Second, there is some variation in
markups over time. The two features are not completely unrelated. The fact that average
markups for low-quality memory are positive is entirely attributable to two subperiods.
The ﬁrm sold a large number of low-quality 256MB modules at about ten dollars above
cost in September-October 2000 and a large number at about ﬁve dollars above cost in
February-March 2001. We think we understand what happened in the former period. A
small number of retailers found an obscure supplier willing to sell them 256MB modules at a
price far below the price oﬀered by the standard wholesale distributors.43 As a result, there
were eﬀectively six or fewer retailers competing in these two months rather than dozens.44
We do not know why higher markups prevailed in February and March of 2001. In this
period markups were relatively high in all four memory categories.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have noted that the extent to which the Internet will reduce consumer
search costs is not clear. While the Internet clearly facilitates search, it also allows ﬁrms to
adopt a number of strategies that make search more diﬃcult. In the Pricewatch universe,
we see that demand is sometimes remarkably elastic, but that this is not always what
happens.
The most popular obfuscation strategy for the products we study is to intentionally
create an inferior quality good that can be oﬀered at a very low price. Retailers could,
of course, avoid the negative impact of search engines simply by refusing to let the search
engines have access to their prices. This easy solution, however, has a free rider problem—
if other ﬁrms are listing, I will suﬀer from not being listed. What may help make the
43The ﬁrst retailer to have found the supplier appears to have found it on July 10. On that day, when the
ﬁrm that supplied us with data bought modules wholesale for $270, PC Cost cuts its retail price to $218—a
full $51 below the next lowest price. The ﬁrm remained all alone with a price at least $37 less than that of
any other ﬁrm for three weeks. We infer from this that its acquisition costs must have been very low.
44We cannot provide any estimates about how the markups of the low-cost retailers varied in August as
the number of low-cost retailers increased from one to (we think) six, because the retailer from which we
got the data appears to be the last of the six to have found the low-priced supplier. At that point, in early
September, low-quality memory modules were selling for about $10 above cost. Markups remained steady
and no other retailers appear to have found the supplier for the next two months. At the end of October
wholesale prices fell dramatically, apparently eliminating the advantage. At this point several retailers that
had been absent for months jumped to the top of the Pricewatch list and margins on low-quality memory
quickly dropped to approximately zero.
38obfuscation strategy we observe popular is that it is hard not to copy it—if a retailer tries
to advertise a decent quality product with reasonable contractual terms at a fair price it will
be buried behind dozens of lower price oﬀers on the search engine’s list. The endogenous-
quality aspect of the practice makes it somewhat diﬀerent from previous bait-and-switch
and loss-leader models, and it seems that it would be a worthwhile topic for research.45
We would also be interested to see more work integrating search engines into models with
search frictions, exploring other obfuscation techniques (such as individualized prices), and
trying to understand why adoption of price search engines has been slow.
Large online retailers have very high expenses. Although they can avoid the expense of
setting up hundreds of retail locations, they have to handle every item they ship individually.
It is much cheaper to ship a truckload of merchandise to a store than to ship a similar
number of individual packages with UPS. It is cheaper to have a customer take packages
oﬀ the shelf and bring them to a cashier than it is to hire someone to pick packages oﬀ
shelves and put them in boxes. Large online retailers also have very high expenses of other
types: they have been very intensive users of managerial talent; they have spent a lot on
advertising; and they have enormous website development costs.46
Given these expenses, large e-retailers cannot be competitive with Walmart’s prices.
This is not necessarily worrisome. Many people may be willing to pay a premium to avoid
going to the mall and to take advantage of superior product variety. A more serious problem
is that managerial, advertising, and website development costs seem more like ﬁxed costs
than marginal costs. If price search engines become more popular, and better sources of
information develop on the reliability of retailers, then vigorous price competition may push
online prices below the level necessary to cover these ﬁxed costs.
What will happen to e-retail if price search ﬂourishes? One thing we have seen can
happen is that demand can become incredibly elastic, so elastic that retailers could never
break even. While this is a frightening possibililty to retailers, it does not seem very likely
to us. In seems likely that retailers would make signiﬁcant eﬀorts to ensure that price search
45Simester’s (1995) model seems the most similar to the practice. We would imagine, however, that what
makes the low prices on Pricewatch have advertising value is that the oﬀerings are suﬃciently attractive so
as to force a retailer to set low prices for its other oﬀerings to avoid having everyone buy the advertised
product.
46Amazon, for example, reported more than $250 million in R&D costs in 2000.
39engines never work too well, and markups will end up at least as high as they are in the
(unbranded) Pricewatch universe. Similar markups would force large retailers to cut back
substantially on management, advertising, and website costs, but it is certainly plausible
that they could do so. Another possibility is that e-retail could end up with a very diﬀerent
market structure than traditional retail. Small e-retailers without venture capital realized
long ago that the Internet allows one to operate a retail store with virtually no advertising
or website development costs. At present, small e-retailers are far more eﬃcient than their
more famous competitors. Whether they will remain more eﬃcient and come to dominate
price-search mediated markets or whether they will be pushed aside as larger ﬁrms copy
their model is another interesting question.
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PRICE FOR ONLINE ORDERS ONLY - 
128MB PC100 SDRAM DIMM - 8ns 
Gold leads
.- * LIMIT ONE - 
Easy installation - in 
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SDRAM PC100 16x64 168pin
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unbuffered SDRAM Gold Lead 168 
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Figure 1: A sample Pricewatch search list: 128MB PC100 memory modules at 12:01pm
ET on October 12, 2000.
















Figure 2: Prices for 128MB PC100 memory modules: the lowest and 12th lowest prices on
Pricewatch and website B’s price
44AIB 512MB PC3200 400 MHz DDR <font color=red>***Free Shipping***</font>
Memory Spec. Chart - PC3200 DDR 512MB (Select Your Memory Module)
Samsung/Micron or Major 
512MB PC3200 [ADD $25] 
l     CAS 2.5 Latency 
l     Hand Picked 5ns 
l     6 Layer Low Noise Shielded 
PCB Board 
l     32x8 DRAM Type 
l     Samsung/Micron or Major 
Brands 
l     Return Shipping Paid 
l     No Restocking Fee 
l     Satisfaction & Compatibility 
Guaranteed 
l     Lifetime Warranty 
l     15 Days Full Refund 
l     Memory Tested Before Ship 
Out 
l     Copper Heat Sink - Cool Down 
the Memory up to 40% 
Industry Standard 512MB 
PC3200 [ADD $15] 
l     CAS 2.5 Latency 
l     Hand Picked 5ns 
l     6 Layer Low Noise Shielded 
PCB Board 
l     32x8 DRAM Type 
l     Industry Standard DRAM 
Chips 
l     7 Days No Restocking Fee 
l     Return Shipping not Paid 
l     Improved Compatibility 
l     Lifetime Warranty 
l     Aluminum Heat Sink - Cool 
Down the Memory up to 35% 
OEM 512MB PC3200 
l     CAS 3 Latency 
l     4 Layer Module Board 
l     64x4 DRAM Type 
l     OEM DRAM Downgrade 
Chips 
l     20% Restocking Fee 
According to the Market Value 
l     Verify Compatibility with 
Memory Configurator 
l     Return Shipping not Paid 
l     9 Months Warranty 
¡@
ADD MORE HEAT SPREADER FOR MEMORY: 
NO ADDITIONAL HEAT SINK (+$0)
ADD ONE MORE COPPER HEAT SINK (+$6.99)
ADD ONE MORE RAINBOW HEAT SINK (+$3.99)
THERMALTAKE COOLING KIT (+$8.99)
HEAT SINK INSTALLATION: 
PLEASE INSTALL THE HEATSINK FOR MY MEMORY (AT NO CHARGE) (+$0)
NO, I WILL INSTALL IT MYSELF 
TESTING OPTION:
TEST MY MEMORY BEFORE SHIP OUT (+$3.99)
SHIPPING UPGRADE: 
FREE Ground SHIPMENT (+$0)
Upgrade to UPS Ground Shipping w/ Insurance (+$7.99)
Upgrade to UPS NextDay Shipping w/ Insurance (+$28.00)
Upgrade to UPS SecondDay Shipping w/ Insurance (+$21.00)
file:///D|/GLENN/PCBoost/paper/buyaib.htm (1 of 2) [12/12/2003 2:37:13 PM]
Figure 3: A website designed to induce consumers to upgrade to a higher quality memory
module.













MAY WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING FOR YOUR - PRICEWATCH SPECIALS -- 
MEMORY - 512MB PC3200 DDR 400FSB 
 
 
Tufshop Price: $53.81 
Price (with Selected Options):      $90.36
Super Buys 
Make processor upto 30% faster or your motherboard to run with 
maximum efficiency. You must have this awesome value package. 
(Highly Recommended)
  g f e d c Memory Upgrade - Certified intel Approved specs Memory [+$23.11]
  g f e d c Memory Upgrade - Certified AMD Approved specs Memory [+$17.35]
Bonus Buys 
Consider taking advantage of these special offers. Compare and 
save. Purchase everything from one location and save on shipping 
  g f e d c Cable Upgrades - Rounded IDE and Floppy Cables (Complete Set) [+$11.91]
  g f e d c Essential Equipment - Sony Floppy Disk Drive [+$16.84]
  g f e d c b Bonus Buy - 10 pack of hand thumbscrews for Case [+$4.95]
  g f e d c Bonus Buy - 12-Pc Computer Tool Kit [+$16.98]
  g f e d c Bonus Buy - RatPadzGS Ultimate Mousepad/Gaming Surface [+$11.97]
  g f e d c Bonus Buy - CD-DVD Media Cleaning Kit [+$4.93]
  g f e d c Thermal Management - Dynatron 80mm Case Fan [+$12.87]
Related Options 
Please take advantage of these special offers. 
  g f e d c
Memory Upgrade - CAS 2 Upgrade (Offers Performance Increase & Helps in 
Overclocking) [+$18.25]
  g f e d c b
Memory Upgrade - CAS 2.5 Upgrade (Improves Performance over Cas3 & Helps 
with Applications and Games) [+$6.35]
Pretest 
Have us test your merchandise before we ship to avoid costly 
RMAs in the future and Maximize your time 
  n m l k j No Pretesting
  n m l k j i Pretest - Standard Pretest (Avoid costly RMAs) [+$6.97]
Memory Performance 
Options to make your hardware & applications fly 
  n m l k j No Memory Performance Enhancements
  n m l k j i
Memory Upgrade - 6 Layer PCB For Stablity of Memory - more layer - More = 
Better Design [+$8.37]
Enhancers 
Options to make your hardware & applications fly 
  n m l k j No System Performance Enhancers
  n m l k j Memory Upgrade - Thermaltake Memory Cooling Kit (Active) [+$19.99]
  n m l k j Memory Cooling - Copper Passive Memory Cooling Kit [+$11.15]
  n m l k j i Memory Cooling - Aluminium Passive Memory Cooling Kit [+$9.91]
  n m l k j Memory Upgrade - Thermaltake Memory Cooling Kit (Passive) [+$14.99]
Figure 4: Another website designed to induce consumers to upgrade and/or buy add-ons
46Variable Mean Stdev Min Max
128MB PC100 Memory Modules
683 website-day observations
LowestPrice 62.98 33.31 21.00 120.85
Range1-12 6.76 2.52 1.00 13.5
PLow 66.88 34.51 21.00 123.49
PMid 90.72 40.09 35.49 149.49
PHi 115.27 46.36 48.50 185.50
log(1 + PLowRank) 1.86 0.53 0.69 3.26
QLow 12.80 17.03 0 163
QMid 2.01 3.31 0 25
QHi 1.86 3.45 0 47
128MB PC133 Memory Modules
608 website-day observations
LowestPrice 71.02 37.02 21.00 131.00
Range1-12 5.92 2.74 2.00 15.00
PLow 73.68 36.69 21.00 131.49
PMid 98.50 41.84 22.10 153.45
PHi 128.46 47.56 48.50 189.50
log(1 + PLowRank) 1.77 0.64 0.69 3.40
QLow 10.08 12.13 0 99
QMid 2.14 4.91 0 100
QHi 4.79 3.93 0 35
256MB PC100 Memory Modules
575 website-day observations
LowestPrice 130.30 58.17 32.46 215.00
Range1-12 28.95 15.78 6.39 75.80
PLow 143.44 67.15 47.67 283.49
PMid 205.29 85.36 77.49 372.89
PHi 250.09 93.14 98.49 417.18
log(1 + PLowRank) 1.90 0.55 0.69 2.91
QLow 2.87 4.61 0 33
QMid 1.00 1.88 0 18
QHi 0.87 1.63 0 16
256MB PC133 Memory Modules
575 website-day observations
LowestPrice 143.90 71.97 32.46 269.00
Range1-12 25.49 14.01 6.60 67.00
PLow 155.75 77.95 43.00 291.45
PMid 213.14 91.91 78.49 345.45
PHi 249.95 92.26 104.37 392.21
log(1 + PLowRank) 1.97 0.49 0.69 2.73
QLow 5.29 10.24 0 136
QMid 1.10 1.93 0 12
QHi 3.61 3.86 0 19
Table 1: Summary statistics for memory module data
47Variable Mean Stdev Min Max
Data for Website B
392 clock speed-day observations
PLow 180.80 43.84 105.25 302.45
PHi 219.68 43.90 142.39 341.45
log(1 + PLowRank) 2.08 0.42 0.88 2.64
QLow 0.88 1.25 0 8
QHi 0.57 0.92 0 6
LowestPrice 173.08 42.36 97.00 298.33
Range1-12 11.16 5.62 3.75 36.69
Data for Website C
392 clock speed-day observations
PLow 180.83 44.17 103.59 302.25
PMid 214.71 43.96 136.49 336.25
PHi 230.69 44.54 150.64 365.47
log(1 + PLowRank) 1.99 0.49 0.69 2.64
QLow 1.07 1.54 0 12
QMid 0.83 1.29 0 9
QHi 0.52 0.85 0 4
LowestPrice 173.08 42.36 97.00 298.33
Range1-12 11.16 5.62 3.75 36.69
Table 2: Summary statistics for AMD Athlon processor data
Dep. var.: quantities
Independent of each quality level
Variables Low q Mid q High q
log(1 + PLowRank) -1.48† -0.76∗ -0.41∗
(15.1) (5.8) (3.2)
log(PMid) 0.43 -6.86∗ 2.72∗
(0.5) (5.9) (2.0)
log(PHi) -0.06 2.68 -5.10∗
(0.1) (1.8) (3.9)
SiteB -0.26∗ -0.31∗ -0.59∗
(3.5) (2.9) (5.7)
Weekend -0.51∗ -0.95∗ -0.72∗
(8.6) (8.1) (5.9)
log(LowestPrice) -1.08 1.10 0.90
(1.6) (1.3) (1.1)
Number of Obs. 683 683 683
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. ∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level. †
denotes signiﬁcance at the 10−48% level.
Table 3: Demand for 128MB PC100 Memory Modules
48128MB PC100 Modules 128MB PC133 Modules
Low Mid Hi Low Mid Hi
PLow -25.0∗ -12.9∗ -7.0∗ PLow -33.0∗ -11.5∗ -4.1∗
PMid 0.4 -6.9∗ 2.7∗ PMid 0.2 -1.5 -0.1
PHi -0.1 2.7 -5.1∗ PHi -0.1 -5.5∗ -4.5∗
256MB PC100 Modules 256MB PC133 Modules
Low Mid Hi Low Mid Hi
PLow -36.8∗ -16.3∗ -5.5∗ PLow -41.4∗ -28.4∗ -11.5
PMid 7.9 -3.9 -4.1∗ PMid -2.7 4.5 3.6
PHi -3.4 2.4 -2.6 PHi -1.4 -5.5 -1.0
Table 4: Price elasticities for memory modules: three qualities in each of four product
classes
Dep. var.: quantities
Independent of each quality level
Variables Low q Mid q High q
log(1 + PLowRank) -1.14∗ -0.86∗ 0.10
(6.1) (4.7) (0.3)
log(PMid) -0.34 -4.81 4.14
(0.1) (0.8) (0.4)
log(PHi) -2.70 -2.98 -21.48
(0.7) (0.5) (1.5)
Weekend -0.47∗ -0.26 -0.81∗
(2.4) (1.2) (3.0)
log(LowestPrice) -1.47 2.86 6.77
(0.5) (1.0) (1.5)
TimeinDays -0.02∗ -0.02∗ -0.01
(2.3) (2.3) (0.7)
LowHasFan 0.46 -0.25 -1.14∗
(1.8) (0.9) (2.3)
Speed650 -2.88∗ -2.97∗ -5.74∗
(2.5) (2.9) (3.0)
Speed700 -1.66∗ -1.67∗ -3.07∗
(1.9) (2.2) (2.1)
Speed750 -0.82 -1.19∗ -2.34∗
(1.5) (2.5) (2.5)
Number of Obs. 392 392 392
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. ∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Table 5: Demand for Athlon CPU’s at site C
49Product Category
Dependent 128MB 128MB 256MB 256MB Athlon Athlon
Variable PC100 PC133 PC100 PC133 CPUs CPUs
Memory Memory Memory Memory Site B Site C
Low -1.47 -1.41 -1.79 -2.29 -1.28 -1.14
Quality (0.10) (0.09) (0.36) (0.36) (0.27) (0.19)
Sales
Medium -0.76 -0.49 -0.79 -1.57 -0.86
Quality (0.13) (0.12) (0.29) (0.79) (0.18)
Sales -0.97
(0.31)
High -0.41 -0.18 -0.66 -0.64 0.10
Quality (0.13) (0.06) (0.25) (0.35) (0.30)
Sales
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 6: Eﬀect of low quality Pricewatch rank on sales of each quality level: estimates from
six datasets.
Independent Dep. variable: Dummy for choice of site A
Variables Medium and high Medium quality High quality
log(1 + PLowRank) -0.38∗ -0.68∗ -0.22∗
(5.12) (4.57) (3.03)
log(P) -3.01∗ -0.87 -5.03∗
(3.18) (0.67) (3.53)
Number of Obs. 10845 4078 6757
The table presents estimates of logit models. The dependent variable is a dummy for
whether a consumer chose to buy from site A (as opposed to site B). The ﬁrst column
pools the observations from all eight speciﬁc products: medium- and high-quality; 128MB
and 256MB; PC100 and PC133. The second and third are separate regressions for the
medium- and high-quality subsamples. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. ∗
denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level. The regressions also included category dummies and
a linear time trend.
Table 7: Evidence of incomplete consumer learning: eﬀects of product prices and low-quality
price rankings on where consumers buy medium- and high-quality memory modules.
50Dependent variables: Quantity of 128MB PC100
memory modules of each quality level
Independent Other speed instruments Cost instruments
Variables Low Mid Hi Low Mid Hi
log(1 + PLowRank) -1.48∗ -0.45 -0.22 -1.89∗ -0.34 0.79
(7.8) (1.5) (0.6) (5.0) (0.2) (1.7)
log(PMid) -1.06 -7.78∗ -0.47 11.93 -9.07 -2.49
(0.7) (3.8) (0.1) (1.9) (1.1) (0.5)
log(PHi) 3.58 2.84 -3.35 5.54 4.26 -5.30∗
(1.9) (1.0) (0.9) (1.0) (0.5) (1.7)
SiteB -0.28∗ -0.49∗ -0.61∗ -0.40 -0.48 -1.10∗
(2.9) (3.2) (3.3) (1.9) (1.2) (4.3)
Weekend -0.48∗ -0.97∗ -0.67∗ -0.57∗ -0.98∗ -0.75∗
(7.9) (8.0) (5.1) (2.0) (6.9) (5.2)
log(LowestPrice) -1.85∗ 0.71 0.80 -5.01∗ 1.02 1.21
(2.6) (0.7) (0.8) (2.5) (0.3) (0.7)
Number of Obs. 683 683 683 683 683 683
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. ∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
Table 8: Instrumental variables estimates of PC100 128MB Memory Demand Model
Product Category
128 MB Memory 256 MB Memory CPU/fan combos
Quality PC100 PC133 PC100 PC133 Site B Site C
Low -0.7% -2.4% 4.2% 2.9% -3.4% -4.4%
Mid 17.0% 15.6% 16.3% 19.9% 9.3%
Hi 27.2% 26.9% 24.3% 24.9% 9.5% 14.7%
Overall 7.6% 11.5% 12.6% 15.8% 2.8% 6.3%
Average in $ $5.06 $10.25 $17.63 $22.41 $5.62 $12.40
The table presents revenue-weighted mean percentage markups for products sold by web-
sites A, B, and C in each of six product categories.
Table 9: Mean percentage markup in six product classes
51Predicted site B Predicted proﬁts
quantities Base costs c = 78 c = 68
Rank Price QLow QMid QHi Site B Site A Site B Site B
1 68 54.4 5.3 2.8 -5 147 -343 275
2 69 29.9 3.9 2.3 92 229 -95 259
3 70 19.5 3.1 2.1 122 246 -2 239
4 72 14.1 2.6 1.9 145 264 55 235
5 74 10.7 2.3 1.8 154 267 85 227
6 74 8.5 2.0 1.6 141 244 85 202
7 74 7.0 1.8 1.6 130 225 84 184
8 75 5.9 1.7 1.5 127 218 88 175
9 77 5.0 1.5 1.4 129 217 96 172
10 77 4.4 1.4 1.4 121 204 92 160
11 78 3.9 1.3 1.3 118 198 92 154
12 78 3.4 1.3 1.3 112 188 89 145
The table presents predicted sales and proﬁts that website B would have earned if it had
occupied each position on the Pricewatch list pictured in Figure 1 throughout the day on
October 12, 2000.
Table 10: Predicted proﬁts as a function of rank: October 12, 2000
52